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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and I 
through its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, Bcspondcnt, 
l!_;VA WHI'rl~ ~::·-:-OEL WHITE, \ 
her husband, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
Case 
No. 
10832 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the record. 
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in 
the trial court.) 
STATEMENT OF THJ!J KIND OF CASE 
AND DISPOSI'l1ION IN LOWEH COURT 
On November 22, 1965, Plaintiff commenced an action 
in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, 
to condemn 17.'.70 acres of the Defendants' lands and im-
1 
provements situate in Summit County, State of Utah 
' said lands to be utilized for the purpose of constructing 
a portion of Interstate Highway I-80. (R. 12, 13, and 80) 
The authority for the taking was not in dispute and 
the sole issue before the Court was a determination of 
the amount to be paid Defendants for the lands and im-
provements taken and the severance damage caused by 
such taking. 
The case came on for jury trial in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, by order of the court, before the 
Honorable A. 11. Ellett, Judge, on the 28th day of N ovem-
ber, 19G6, and was concluded on November 29, 1966. 
A judgment on the verdict was duly entered awarding 
Defondants the sum of $56,000.00 for the lands taken, 
$29,000.00 for the improvements taken, and nothing for 
severance, for a total award of $85,000.00. 
rrl1creafter, Defendants filed a Motion for an Addi-
tur, or, in the Alternative, a New Trial which, after hear-
ing, was duly denied. Whereupon this appeal was insti-
tuted. 
RELIEF' SOUGH'l' ON APPEAL 
The Defendant landowners, by this appeal, seek a re-
versal of the trial court's ruling in denying their Motion 
for a N cw Trial, and an Order of this Court granting a 
new trial. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 22, 1965, Defendants were the owners 
of approximately 201 acres of land located about 17 miles 
cast of Salt Lake City, Utah, and one-quarter mile west 
of Kimball's Junction along U.S. Highway 40, in Summit 
County, State of Utah (It. -1, 12, 26, and 27) (Exhibit 
P-1). Said property was divided into two parcels by U.S. 
Highway 40 which extended across said lands in a general 
northwest-southeast direction (R. 4). 
At that time, the Defendants' lands fronted on and 
enjoyed unrestrided access to u.S. Highway 40 on both 
si<le8 of said highway (Bxhibit P-1, P-2 an<l R 14, 
1.J, 18, 27, and 28). 1'he parcel of land located on the 
southerly side of the highway had a gradual slope from 
the highway to a bench area some 10 to 30 feet higher than 
the highway (R. 20). 1'hcre were no jmprovements lo-
cated upon this parcel of lan<l with the exception of a 
gravel pit in one corner near the highway (H. 28). A 
portion of said land had been used for raising alfalfa with 
the balance remaining in a natural state of wild grass and 
sagebrush (R. 28 and 29). After the taking, this particu-
lar parcel comprised aLout 95.41 acres (R. 13). 
The parcel of land on the northerly side of the high-
way was approximately lewl with the highway to a depth 
of about 600 feet and for a frontage of about 1:.:00 feet 
(R. 30 and 73). The remainder of the frontage on the 
north side was lower than the highway and sloped down 
to a creek, thence easterly from the creek up a hillside (R. 
SO and 73). After the taking, this parcel comprised about. 
3 
81.39 acres less 5 acres along the creekbed which Defend-
ants had previously sold to one Robert McComb (R. 13, 
34 and Exhibit P-1). Located upon the level portion of 
this tract and near the highway "'ere three structures. 
One was a building approximately 36 feet by 65 feet com-
prising 4,040 square feet and utilized for the purpose of 
conducting a caf e business and sale of soft drinks and 
beer ( R. 34, 35). Attached to and forming a part of this 
building were modern living quarters consisting of seven 
rooms, with one room converted to a walk-in freezer 
(R. 38, 45, 120). The portion of this building devoted to 
cafe business was constructed in 1947 or 1948 of block 
construction with a false cedar siding front (R. 34, 39, 
and 43). The walls and ceiling of the cafe were finished 
in knotty pine except for a portion back of the bar which 
was finished in cherrywood paneling and the overflow 
dining room which was plaster finish (R. 38, 39, 132 and 
E.xhibits D 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). 
A second building was located to the rear of the 
cafe building and comprised a 10-unit motel and laundry 
room comprising 2491 square feet (Exhibit P-1 and P2, 
R. 37, 38, 120 and Exhibits D 6, 7, and 8). Although this 
particular building was not located within the area of 
the proposed Interstate Highway I-80, it was stipulated 
by counsel at the time of trial that the proximity of the 
highway was so near the motel, that its value was totally 
destroyed and thereforP, the Plaintiff would consider said 
motel development as an item to be totally compensated 
for in the trial of the case (R. 21, 22, and Exhibit P-1). 
'rho motel unit was of cinderblock construction with metal 
4 
roof and knotty pine walls and ceiling finish on the in-
terior. Five units were carpeted and each unit had a 
shower, toilet, basin and individual heating (R. 43 and 
133). The motel was constructed in 1947 or 1948 (R. 43). 
Also on the date of taking, a third building existed 
south of the main cafe building which was an old frame 
home with a partial cinderblock basement comprising 
1,110 square feet (R. 44, 120). The partitions of the 
rooms had been removed and the structure was in a poor 
condition (R. 31, 45, 46). 
The improvements \\'ere serviced by a 268-foot private 
water well and a pumping system located beneath the 
cafo building, and the sewage was disposed of by septic 
tank and leeching fields (R. 40 and 41). 
On the date of taking, N overnber 22, 1965, the Defend-
ants were conducting upon the land and premises herein 
ref erred to a general cafo and motel business and were 
residing upon said lands (R 35, 47, 58). The customers 
for said business were derived primarily from the passing 
motorists (R. 47). 
SubsP(1uent to the taking, and prior to the date of 
trial, the Plaintiff entered upon the condemned property 
and wrecked the improvements to the extent that the old 
residPnce located south of the main cafe building was 
totally demolished and remowd and the interiors of the 
cafe and motel buildings were gutted and the improve-
ments were otherwise reduced to a state of great dis-
re1iair and delapidation (R. 48, 71, 202-203 and Affidavits 
introduced in support of Motion for New Trial). 
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On the date of trial, the motel ''ms being used as a 
stable for horses and thr interior of the cafe had been 
completely gutted. 
After the taking, the pro1Jerty will have only limited 
access by frontage roads (R. 80, 81, 82, Ex. P-1 and P-2), 
the northerly parcel being ~Prviced by an interchange at 
Kimball's Junction, one quartt~r mile southeast of the 
property and the southerly portion having access by two 
interchanges, one at Kimball's Junction and the other at 
Parley's Summit, some ± miles west of the parcel of land 
(R. 16, 80, 109, 110, Ex. P-1 and P-2). 
STATEMENT OF PULX'l'S H-ELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE JURY TO VIEW THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE 
PREMISES. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THE JURORS WERE GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN VIEW· 
ING THE IMPROVEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE ADMONI· 
TION OF THE COURT. 
ARfl1Tl\1I~NT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND· 
ANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS 
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THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE JURY TO VIEW THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE 
PREMISES. 
78-3-±-11 U.C.A. 1953 fixes the time for detennining 
value of the land and the damages "at the date of the 
service of the summons." Therefore, N overnber 22, 1965, 
becomes the prime and tritiwl elate in the instant case for 
determining Defendants' clamagl·s, and the condition of 
the premises on that elate is controlling and of signifi-
cant importante. U ncler ihe eviclente and testimony, we 
believe there was no necessity of viewing the premises and 
particularly the improvl~rncut;:-; tlu·1·con and that the Court 
committed error in permitting the jury to view the same. 
Over the objcdion of counsel and at the conclusion of 
the testimony and evideucL~, and prior to swmnation or 
ddiberation, the 'l'rial Court dircded the jury to be taken 
by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to view the subject 
properties (Ii. W2, 203, and 20-±). 
It is interesting to note that nowhere in the testimony 
was there any substantial tonflict in the description 
of the lands, and upon inquiry by the Court, all of the 
jurors signified that they had previously seen the prop-
erty which was the subject of this litigation (R. 202). 
Due to such indication, the trial judge commented that 
under the circumstances, it probably would not be neces-
sary for the jury to view the premises, however, after fur-
ther inquiry to detennine how many of the jurors had 
previously been inside the cafe building known as "Bill 
an<l lj~va's" and an indication that only two of the jurors 
hatl been in said building, the judge then concluded that it 
7 
would be proper to allow the jury to view the premises 
(R. 202), the Court well knowing that the building at that 
time was in a state of great disrepair and could not pos-
sibly reflect the condition as of the date of taking. As a 
matter of fact, one structure had been removed from the 
premises, the interior of the cafe building gutted, and 
the motel structure gutted and being used as a horse 
stable (R. 48, 71 and affidavits filed in support of Motion 
for New Trial). 
The improvements were a major item of damage, and 
during the trial of the case, the Defendants presented 
photographs of the pertinent structures (Exhibits D 3,4,5, 
6,7,8,9,10) which were designed to reflect the improve-
ments as of the date of taking. The Plaintiff had an op-
portunity to preserve and present the same evidence had 
it so desired. 
There seems little douLt Lut that the weight of au-
thority supports the proposition that a view of the prem-
ises in a condemnation action is within the sound discre-
tion of the Court, however, it seems equally well settled 
that such discretion must not be abused to the extent of 
violating the substantive rights of any of the parties. (See 
103 A.L.R. 163.) 
rrhe better reasoned cases seem to hold that it con-
stitutes error and an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial judge to allow a view where the condition of the 
premises has so changed as to no longer reflect the con-
dition of the property on the date of the taking or to be 
of any assistance to the jury in its deliberations. One of 
8 
the leading landmark cases on this particular point is the 
case of Chioago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666. In this 
action, a petition was filed to condemn certain property 
for the widening of a street. At the time of the hearing, 
some 4 years after the petition had been filed, the prop-
erty had greatly deteriorated owing to inability to lease 
it advantageously because of the existence of the widen-
ing proceedings and the fact that a receiver had taken 
charge under the mortgage. 
In holding that under such circumstances it was an 
abuse of discretion to allow the jury to view the premises, 
the Court there said : 
"There is no method by which there may be 
preserved in a bill of exceptions the evidence of 
the manner in or extent to which the minds of the 
various members of the jury were impressed by a 
view of the building, and where, as here, such 
changes have taken place as to render a view of 
no assistance to the jury, for the reason that the 
condition at the time of the trial does not reflect 
the value as of the time the petition was filed, it is 
an abuse of discretion to permit such view. It will 
he conceded that a photograph which does not pre-
sent a true picture of an object as of the time to 
which the evidence concerning it relates is not 
admissible in evidence except it be with a full ex-
planation of the changes, and we are of the opinion 
that in this case the building showed such deterio-
ration that a view of the premises should not have 
heen permitted. Such view could scarcely have 
bPPn said to be of any assistance to the jury in 
understanding the evidence offered concerning 
the property." 
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Also, in the case of Ajoolian v. Director of Public 
\V or ks ( 1950) RI. 155 A :2nd :2-l--~, 77 A.L.R. 2nd 571, the 
property in question had materially changed for the worse 
between the date the action was cmurncnced and the date 
of the hearing, and the Court tlwrP held that it was an 
abuse of the Trial Court's discretion to allow a view of the 
premises and further held that it was prejudicial to the 
land owners' right to a fair hearing. 
Of further iuterest, is the ease of United States v . 
.U75.:23aacs (1%7, DC NY) l:Jl F. Supp. 590 2nd; U.S. 
v. Babinski ( CA:2) 25± F:2ml GS(j, wherein the Court said: 
''\Vhil<' a vi('\\' of t]1(• property by the court, 
jury, or commission is not now required, it is con-
sid1:~red advisablt>, where possible, and when the 
physical charactPrislics of the land and improve-
ments have not so ehanged since the taking as to 
impair th<' vahw ol' personal inspection." (Em-
phasis added) 77 A.L.R. 2d 569. 
Of further significance are the cases which have held 
that although a view of of the premises is within the 
sound discretion of the Court, it does not constitute an 1 
abuse of such discretion where a view is denied because 
of changed conditions. In this regard see: Aleverti v. 
Walla, Walla., 162 vVash. 487, 298 P. 698, and J. H. Mai 
and Leu.a. Mai v. Garden City Kansas, 177 Kan. 179, 277 
P2d 636. 
In many rases the courts ha Vf> consistently held that 
it would constitute prejudicial t>rror to permit a view of 
the premises where said properties have been improved 
between the date of taking and the trial date, holding that 
10 
a view would not be of any material assistance to the 
jury and may unfairly prejudice the jury. In this regard 
see: Fitch v. State Highway Commission, 137 Kan. 584, 
21 P2d 318. 
When we consider the vast differences between the 
damages assessed by the appraiser for the Plaintiff: $75-
432.00 (R. 153), and the damages assessed by appraisers 
for the Defendants: $141,500 .. 00 (R. 79), and $152,921.00 
(R.123), it seems quite obvious that some distorted factor 
entered into the picture to influence the minds of the jury 
in assessing the total damages and we submit that a view 
of the dilapidated buildings did in fact greatly and ma-
terially contribute to the overall penurious award. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THE JURORS WERE GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN VIEW-
ING THE IMPROVEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE ADMONI-
TION OF THE COURT. 
It was pointed out to the Court by counsel for both 
parties that the improvements on the premises were dil-
apidated and in a gutted condition at the time of trial (R. 
202, 203), and as borne out by the testimony of various 
witnesses (R. 48, 71, 202, 203). Furthermore, counsel for 
Defendants objected to a view of the improvements and 
advised the Court that such a view would not be of any 
assistance to the jury (R. 202, 203). 
Under these circumtances, the Court admonished the 
jury that they could view the land and the exterior of the 
11 
improvement::>, but that it would be of no help studying 
the inside of the buildings ( R 20-:l-). 0 bvi ously, the Court 
was aware of the inherPnt dang('r of permitting a view of 
the interior of the buildings under the circumstances and 
the intrinsic danger of prejudict; developing in the minds 
of the jurors, which would be detrimental to the substan. 
tive rights of the Defendants. 
In the light of this condition and the admonition of 
the Court, the jury, \\·hi ch was placed in the custody of the 
Sheriff of :::>alt Lake County, was taken to the subject 
property and there permitted to view the san1e. 
Contrary to the admonition of the trial judge, the 
jurors did in fact makl' an insvedion of the improvements ' 
in their dilapidated condition, wl1id1 included a detailed 
inspection of the interior of the structures. (Affidavits 
filed in support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial). 
This conduct ou the part of the jury was not dis-
covered until after the trial had been concluded and the 
verdict rendered due to the fact that the jury was taken 
1 
to view the premises without the judge or counsel being 
in attendance. 
rro what extent such unauthorized view influenced 
the minds of the jurors we cannot say, but certainly the 1 
substantive rights of thP DPfrndant landowners were 
jeopardized. llad the Court intC>nded such a view of the 
interior, it would have hel:'n necesimry to establish a more 
complete and detailed foundation, and for the same reason 
that a photograph is not admissible in evidence without 
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first establishing an adequate foundation, a view of the 
improvements was error. 
In the absence of such a proper foundation, the dan-
ger is ever present of the attention of the jury being 
invited to portions and conditions of the premises not 
properly before it for consideration. 
The actions and conduct of the jurors in viewing the 
premises has of necessity been established by the affi-
davits secured by both Plaintiff and Defendants in sup-
port of and in opposition to the .Motion filed by Defend-
ant landowners for a new trial of the case. It is of inter-
est to note that the affidavits procured by the Plaintiff 
and filed in opposition to Defendants' Motion for New 
Trial, corroborated the affidavits submitted by the De-
fendant landowners to the effect that the jurors did in 
fact make an inspection of the interior of the improve-
ments located upon the land contrary to the court's ad-
monition. 
The Utal1 Supreme Court in the case of White v. 
Pease, ct al., 15 Utali 170, 49 P. 41G, and the case of 
Wright v. U.P. R.R. Co., 22 Utah 338, G2 P. 317, has 
recognized the principal that affidavits of jurors may be 
reviewed on appeal if properly preserved in the record 
by inclusion of said affidavits as part of the Motion for 
New Trial. 
The general rule, it is true, is to the effect that jurors 
may not by affidavit impeach their verdict, which prin-
cipal of law seems well founded, however, this rule seems 
primarily designed to protect the sanctity of jury deliber-
13 
ations and conduct within the jury room. The conduct of 
the jury complained of here' was such that others could 
have observed it if present and therefore does not violate 
the sanctity of the jurors' deliberations. Furthermore ' 
' 
the conduct complained of occurred prior to the sub. 1 
mission of the case to the jury. 
In the case of City uf Miami v .Frances Bopp, 158 
So. 89 and as cited in 97 A.L.R. 1035, the Court there dis-
cussing the use of affidavits said: 
''It is true, as a general rule, on the ground of 
public policy, that the affidavit, deposition, or 
statement of a juror will not be received to im-
peach his own verdict; but this court has hereto-
fore recognized excc1Jtions to that rule, and espe- , 
cially thu.t exception which is generally recognized 
by the courts of this country. 
In Linsley v. State, 88 Fla. 135, 101 So. 273, 275, we 
said: 
"It is upon grounds of p1tblic policy that the ' 
rule is obsrrved that the affidavit, deposition, or 
statement of a juror will not be received to irn-
peach his own verdict; but this rule relates to 1 
matters resting in the personal consciousness of 
the juror, as said by llf r. Justice Brewer in Perry 
v. Bailry, 12 Kan. 539. When a juror is heard to 1 
impeach his own verdict because of some matter 
restinq in his own consciousness, the power is 
gii·en ·to him to nullify the rxpressed conclusions 1 
under oa·th of himsrlf and eleven others. 'The 
general rule is that affidavits of jurors are admis-
sible to explain and uphold their verdict, but not 1 
to impeach and overthrow it. But this ~ene~al 
rule is subject to this qualification, that affidavits 
of jurors may be received, for the purpose of 
14 
avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring 
during the trial or in the jury room which does 
not essentially inhere in the verdwt itself.' 
"The rule announced in the Kansas case seems 
to us to be a salutary one and more consistent with 
reason and sound policy. That rule, as announced 
by Mr. Justice Brewer, is that all those matters 
lying outside the personal consciousness of the in-
dividu<il juror, those things which are matters of 
sight and hearing, and therefore accessible to the 
testimony of others and subject to contradWtion; 
the interests of justice will be promoted and no 
sound public policy disturbed, if the secrecy of the 
jury box is not permitted to be the safe cover for 
the pepctration of wr.ongs upon parties litigant. 
If the jury has been t,111ilty of no misconduct, no 
harm has been done by permitting their testimony 
to be received. If the jury has been guilty of mis-
conduct, but such misconduct was not of such a 
nature as to prejudice the rights of the parties, 
the verdict should stand, but the off ending juror 
should be punished. But if such misconduct has 
wrought prejudice, not only should the juror be 
punished, but the verdict should also be set aside; 
but matters resting in the personal consciousness 
of one juror should not be received to overthrow 
the verdict, because, being personal, it is not ac-
cessible to other testimony." (Emphasis added.) 
It is stated in 53 Am. J ur. 772, Section 1109 as follows: 
"The rule that the testimony of jurors will not 
be received to impeach their verdict is subject in 
many jurisdictions to a recognized exception that 
affidavits of jurors may be received to show mat-
ters occurring <luring the trial not essentially in-
hering in the verdict, that is, not falling within or 
pertaining to the legitimate ssues in the case. 
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Thus, there is authority for the view that while 
the testimony of jurors cannot be received to show 
matters which essentially inhere in their ver.dict, 
they may testify as to facts occurring within their 
own personal observation in such a maniner that 
others as well as themselves would be cognizant 
of them and could testify as to them." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Of similar interest is the case of State v. McCormick, 
57 Kan. 440, 46 P. 777 where the Court there said: 
"~While the testimony of jurors cannot be re-
ceiveJ. to show matters which essentially inhere 
in their verdict, they nwy testify to facts which 
transpired within their own personal observation, 
and which transpired in sitch a manner that others, 
as well as themselves, would be cognizamt of them, 
and could testify to them." 
The Comi ther(' eiting OottlcilJ v. Jasper, 27 Kan. 770; 
Ra·ilroad Co. v. Bayes, 42 Kan. 609, 22 Pac. 741. 
Another case which seems in point is the case of 
Merrell v. City of Stillwater as cited in 249 P2d 715. In 
this case, the Plaintiff was claiming damages to two base-
ments and the rrrial Court ordered the jurors to view the 
premisC's. When it was discovered that the jurors made 
an inspection of only one of the basements, the Plaintiff 
property owner filed a .Motion for New Trial, supported 
by affidavits showing the misconduct on the part of the 
jury, which Motion was deniPd by the trial judge. In re-
versing the Trial Court and holding that the misconduct 
of the jury was error justifying a new trial, the Court 
there said: 
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"When the trial court invoked the above stat-
ute and ordered the jury to view the premises, it 
became its mandatory duty to examine each base-
ment which was alleged to have been damaged by 
the negligent acts of the city. The jury had no 
right to inspect a portion of the premises to the 
exclusion of the other, and its conduct in so doing 
violated the legal rights of the Plaintiff. The 
orderly administration of justice demands that a 
jury scrupulously observe and follow the instruc-
tions of the court. To hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to condoning the act of a jury in ignor-
ing any given instruction of a trial court. Suppose 
in this case that the jury, after being ordered by 
the court to view the premises, had failed to ex-
amine any part of the property. Could it be ar-
gued that such disregard of the court's instruc-
tion would be countenanced or that a new trial 
should not be granted~ w· e think not. It logically 
follows that the trial court erred in overruling the 
motion of the Plaintiff for a new trial." 
In the case of Harrod v. Sanders, 137 Okl. 231, 278 
Pac. 1102, the Trial Court instructed the jury to view cer-
tain offices of the Defendant. While in the process of 
such viewing, one of the jurors became separated and 
only 11 members of the jury viewed the premises. In 
granting a new trial, the Supreme Court there held that 
the failure of the jury to view the premises in a body was 
such misconduct that the rights of the Defendants were 
presumed to be prejudiced. In said case the Court stated: 
"It has been held that, 'where some of the 
jurors make an unauthorized view, the irregular-
ity is not cured by direction of the court to the 
entire jury to make a view, and that, where the 
act of a juror was in direct disobedience to a ruling 
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refusing to allow a view, no inquiry will be made 
as to whetlwr or not prejudice to a party resulted, 
but the verdict will Le set aside on the broad 
ground that the misconduet of the juror has a 
tendency to corrupt and cast suspicion on the ad-
ministration of justice.' 4 C. J. 954; Heline vs. 
Kingston, 8 Kulp (Pa.) 221." 
"The holding in the case of Helme vs. King-
ston, above, we think is founded upon common 
sense and sound reason, and is in harmony with 
the proper administration of justice, and should 
be the rule in this state." 
The Court further considering the matter of permit-
ting the use of affidavits of jurors to show misconduct 
cited with approval and as authority for such use the 
case of M., 0.G. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 55 Okla. 12, 155 P. 233, 
where the Court held: 
"The general rule is that affidavits of jurors 
are admissihle to t•xplain and uphold their verdict, 
but not to impeach and overthrow it. But this gen-
eral rule is subject to this qualification: The affi-
davits of jurors may be received for the purpose 
of avoiding a verdict to show any matter occurring 
during the trial, or in the jury room, which does 
not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that 
the jury considered and were influenced by spe-
cific evidence that had not been offered or admit-
ted at the trial; but such evidence is not admissible 
to show any matter which essentially inheres in 
the verdict, as that the juror did not assent to the 
verdict, that he misunderstood the instructions, or 
any other matter resting alone in the juror's 
breast." 
There can be no doubt but that the unauthorized view 
was tantamount to the admission of improper evidence. 
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Furthermore, the affidavits do not conclusively show that 
all of the jurors participated in the unauthorized view. 
Consequently, we are not certain, under the circumstances, 
that all of the jurors had the same evidence before them 
at the time of their deliberations. 
Can it be said under these circumstances that the 
rights of the Defendant landowners were not jeopardized 
or prejudiced~ We think not. 
It being the duty of the Court to safeguard the rights 
of the parties to a fair trial, we respectfully submit that 
the :Motion for New Trial should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's genuine concern regarding a view of 
the premises, we believe, is reflected in the admonition to 
the jury when the Court stated "the jurors will understand 
that the property has been . . . on the inside has been 
changed and altered, suit would be uf nu help to be study-
ing the inside of it. • ':• *" ~Che Court thus recognized the 
inherent danger of prejudice developing. rrhe improve-
ments constituting a major part of the damages then 
became an item of vital interest to Le considered by the 
jury only under the most scru1mlous an<l specified condi-
tions so as to reflect their condition on the date of taking. 
It is well known and understood Ly all, that impressions 
acquired by sight frequently carry a greater impact than 
a thousand words and to quote a favorite expression of 
the trial judge in the instant case: "You can take the fly 
out of the soup but you can't remove the flavor." 
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Considering the fact that Uw State of Utah was the 
responsible party for permitting the premises to be re-
duced to a shambles and in the dila1Jidatcd condition at 
the time of trial, we feel that an extra duty was owed to 
assure a fair presentation of the evidence in this regard, 
and under all the cin:umsta11ce:::;, believe that it was as 
prejudicial and unfair to allow the view as it would have 
been to allow a view if the pro1Jerty had been greatly im-
proved at the time of trial. ln other words, neither party 
should be allowed to "guild the lilly." 
The conduct of the jury is not in dispute as evidenced 
by the affidavits filed by both parties in support of and 
in opposition to the Motion for N cw r_rrial. The use of 
such affidavits to show sud1 comluct we believe is sup-
ported by the better reasoned cases and is in harmony 
with the pri11ciplcs of fair and complete justice. To permit 
or condone the jury's conduct in totally disregarding the 
admonition of the Court cannot be supported under any 
guise or rule of law. 
L~nder the circumstances, we feel the substantive 
rights of the Defendant landowners were violated and 
that the only appropriate redress is a new trial of the 
case. 
Respectfully sub111ith•d, 
BRANrr H. WALL 
Attorney for Defendants-
A]JJJCllants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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